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Dreams and psychosis share several important features regarding symptoms and
underlying neurobiology, which is helpful in constructing a testable model of, for
example, schizophrenia and delirium. The purpose of the present communication
is to discuss two major concepts in dreaming and psychosis that have received
much attention in the recent literature: insight and dissociation. Both phenomena are
considered functions of higher order consciousness because they involve metacognition
in the form of reflective thought and attempted control of negative emotional impact.
Insight in dreams is a core criterion for lucid dreams. Lucid dreams are usually
accompanied by attempts to control the dream plot and dissociative elements akin
to depersonalization and derealization. These concepts are also relevant in psychotic
illness. Whereas insightfulness can be considered innocuous in lucid dreaming and
even advantageous in psychosis, the concept of dissociation is still unresolved. The
present review compares correlates and functions of insight and dissociation in lucid
dreaming and psychosis. This is helpful in understanding the two concepts with regard
to psychological function as well as neurophysiology.
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INTRODUCTION
REM sleep dreaming and psychosis share several important features such as hallucinogenic
imagery, reduced metacognitive thought and disturbed reality discrimination. Moreover, both
dreams and psychosis proceed under a lower level of consciousness, characterized by a sense
of presence – dreams are immersive, they involve here and now experience – and an absence
of future-oriented planning and reflection of past experience (Hobson and Voss, 2010; Joli,
2011). Usually, both the dreamer and also the psychotic patient assume a first-person perspective,
experiencing themselves as active agents instead of passive by-standers. However, dreams and
also psychotic episodes may be accompanied by varying degrees of insight and subjective control.
They may also include dissociative phenomena such as depersonalization and derealization or
out-of-body experiences1.
Insight, control, and dissociation represent the defining criteria of lucid dreams (Van Eeden,
1913; Voss et al., 2009; Voss and Hobson, 2014). Insight is considered the core criterion, whereas
control and dissociation are often, but not always enhanced in lucid dreams. Control enables
dreamers to alter the dream plot, dissociation occurs when the dreamer experiences the dream
1Note here that our definition of dissociation does not include absorption which would rather be viewed as a component of
“sense of reality” (see Voss et al., 2013).
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as if it was displayed on a screen, as in waking derealization,
or sees himself from the outside, as in waking depersonalization
(Sierra and Berrios, 2001; Falkai, 2015; see also Windt and Voss,
2018).
Similar to insight gained in lucid dreams in healthy adults,
some psychotic patients also acquire insight into the internal
nature of their hallucinations or into the illness itself. Such
insight has been shown beneficial for therapeutic outcome and
is associated with higher quality of life and a better prognosis
(Watson et al., 2006; Lincoln et al., 2007; Boyer et al., 2012; Chan
et al., 2012; Riggs et al., 2012). Likewise, perceived control over
psychotic illness is associated with less co-morbid depression
(Birchwood et al., 1993) and need for care (Peters et al., 2017).
Dissociation is also common in psychosis (Allen et al., 1997;
Moskowitz et al., 2005; Touskova et al., 2018). Its functionality,
though, especially with regard to coping with illness, is less
clear. Mostly, the concept of dissociation serves to differentiate
psychotic from neurotic thought (Bürgy, 2010; Peters et al., 2017).
The purpose of this review is to discuss the prospects of
self-induced manipulation of conscious states and to explore the
boundaries of possible therapeutic interventions in psychosis. We
will give special consideration to the role of lucid insight and
dissociation and debate the transferability of research findings
from lucid dreams to insightful psychosis.
CONSCIOUSNESS IN DREAMS AND
PSYCHOSIS
Dream consciousness arises during REM sleep, in the context of a
weakened sensorimotor attachment to the external environment
(Windt, 2018). The complex and dynamic experience of
dreaming is typically characterized by the loss of insight into its
internal origin (Nir and Tononi, 2010). Due to an attenuated
activation of the prefrontal cortex during REM sleep, dreamers
are deprived of their ability to think logically or to make
meaningful decisions (Hobson, 1999; Maquet, 2000; Maquet
et al., 2005; Voss et al., 2009; Dresler et al., 2012; Torterolo
et al., 2016). However, they are intensively engaged in the dream
experience, which is often overwhelmingly emotional. The dream
feels real although it isn’t, and this misperception bears high
similarity with psychotic and delirious states (Freud, 1900/2011;
Hobson, 1999; Scarone et al., 2007; Feinberg, 2011; Joli, 2011).
In previous publications (Hobson and Voss, 2010, 2011;
Voss et al., 2011), we have referred to dream consciousness as
primary, originally based on Freud’s (1900/2011) understanding
of primary processes to describe “a mode of cognition that
is characterized by a primitive, animistic style of thinking”
(Carhart-Harris and Friston, 2010, p. 1266. See also Sinclair,
1922; Edelman, 2004). Primary consciousness represents a lower
level of consciousness and is meant to describe a sense of
immediate presence and an absence of future-oriented planning
and reflection of the past: “Primary consciousness is all that is
present to the subject from moment to moment in one unitary
block, or it is the continuous succession of such presences, before
reflection, judgment or reasoning have set in; before there is any
consciousness of consciousness.”. . . [Secondary consciousness]
. . . is the awareness of awareness. It includes all reflection,
judgment, inference, inductive, and deductive reasoning, all
intellectual processes of experiment and discovery, even such
immediacy as the flash of scientific intuition. It is the play of
thought round and about its object.” (Sinclair, 1922, pp. 112–
113). In other words, secondary consciousness requires meta-
cognitive thought. We will also refer to it as higher order
consciousness.
Regarding dream consciousness, we consider it to be mostly
primary (Hobson and Voss, 2010, 2011). Carhart-Harris et al.
(2014) described it as “regressive style of cognition that is
qualitatively different to the normal waking consciousness
of healthy adult humans” (p. 6). In this primary mode of
consciousness, dreamers are deprived of the means to control
and influence the ongoing experience. Their only choice is
to cope with the immediate and constantly changing scenery.
Consciousness in psychosis has been described in similar terms
(e.g., Galderisi et al., 2004; Joli, 2011; Limosani et al., 2011),
involving alterations of the sense of agency, unity and continuity
that evolve subtly from the prodromal stage to full-blown
psychotic disorders (Schneider, 1957; Galderisi et al., 2004;
Nelson et al., 2009; Hauser et al., 2011). Psychotic patients suffer
from altered perception and processing of reality and impaired
self-reflectiveness (Bora et al., 2007), marking psychotic states
as mostly primary. Often, patients are not able to distinguish
between internal and external cues2.
We consider lucid dreaming and insightful psychosis as hybrid
because in both states thinking is only partially ruled by lower
level consciousness. To some extent, dreamers or patients have –
however, limited – access to higher order consciousness, enabling
them to reflect on their present state. The dream is still a
dream, and the hallucination remains a phantasm. However,
lucid dreamers are able to distance themselves from the ongoing
imagery and may even be successful in attenuating its emotional
impact.
Neurochemically, both dreams and psychotic/delusional
states have been found to occur against a hypercholinergic
and hypo-aminergic background (Hobson and McCarley, 1977;
Ciprian-Ollivier and Cetkovich-Bakmas, 1997; Hobson, 1999,
2009; Molina et al., 2005; Minzenberg et al., 2009; Brooks et al.,
2010; Gottesmann, 2011), with dopaminergic changes mediating
the wake/sleep state dependency (Perry et al., 1999; Collerton and
Perry, 2011; Llewellyn, 2011). These neurochemical modulations
mainly affect the basal forebrain and mesopontine regions (Woolf
and Butcher, 2011). Electrophysiologically, REM sleep dreams
2Interestingly, Friston (2010) and Carhart-Harris et al. (2014) have associated
primary states of consciousness with high entropy and attenuated criticality.
Hightened entropy is associated with increased subjective uncertainty and surprise
or “puzzlement” (p. 2). According to Friston’s (2010) free-energy principle, the
brain aims to keep surprise and free energy at a minimum. Interestingly, although
not widely investigated, either surprise or uncertainty are rarely mentioned in
dream reports (Merritt et al., 1994; Hobson and Friston, 2012) but both might
be more frequent at the onset of lucidity and in prelucid dreams – which are
characterized by uncertainty as to whether one is now dreaming. By contrast,
both are often reported by psychotic patients, suggesting that dreams may share
similarities with psychoses but that the cost in terms of entropy and free energy
elevations are less profound in dreams compared to psychosis, probably owing to
neurophysiologic state-characteristics.
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and psychotic states are accompanied by strongly attenuated
activation and synchronicity in the gamma frequency band (Voss
et al., 2009; Gandal et al., 2012; McNally and McCarley, 2016;
Reilly et al., 2018), suggestive of reduced conscious awareness and
executive ego functions (Desmedt and Tomberg, 1994; Cavinato
et al., 2015). By contrast, a relative increase in gamma band
activity is observed in lucid dreaming (Voss et al., 2009, 2014),
and it would be interesting to explore if similar patterns can be
identified in insightful psychoses.
LUCID DREAMS AND DISSOCIATIVE
MENTAL STATES
Lucidity in dreams refers to a peculiar mental state in which
the dreamer is aware of the fact that he is dreaming while the
dream continues. We have referred to this conscious awareness
as “insight” (Voss et al., 2013). To be able to reflect on the state
of arousal, namely to know that one is asleep and dreaming,
requires that one can take on a third person perspective, i.e.,
to look at oneself as if through the eyes of an outsider. We
label this kind of thinking “dissociative.” Dissociative thought is
heightened in lucid dreaming as compared to normal REM sleep
dreaming. In lucid dreams, taking on a third person perspective
often entails not only the dreamer as a person but the dream
experience itself. Dreamers then report to have seen the dream
sequence from the outside, almost as if the dream were an
ongoing theatrical production or motion picture (Noreika et al.,
2010; Voss et al., 2012, 2014). We consider this to reflect an
even higher level of dissociative thought. In other words, lucid
dreams can be considered dissociated states of consciousness in
which the dream self separates from the ongoing flow of mental
imagery. This phenomenological dissociation is physiologically
accompanied by highly selective increases in gamma band activity
in fronto-temporal areas of the brain (Voss et al., 2009, 2014;
Dresler et al., 2012). At the same time, occipito-parietal regions
retain a typical REM-sleep profile.
Thus, whereas normal REM-sleep dreams share common
neurobiological substrates with organic and so-called
“functional” psychoses (Hobson, 2004; Scarone et al., 2008),
lucid dreams represent a condition of the brain/mind akin to
dissociative mental states in waking, such as derealization and
depersonalization. These terms are used to define subjective
experiences of detachment from the environment or from one’s
experience of oneself or body, respectively (American Psychiatric
Association [APA], 2000; Simeon and Abugel, 2006). In waking,
dissociative thought is generally transient and can be experienced
as an isolated phenomenon or within the context of several
different psychiatric diagnoses (Moskowitz et al., 2005). In
healthy adults, dissociative thought is present, for example, in
daydreaming. It has been linked to fantasy proneness and vivid
experiences during the day (Watson, 2001; Giesbrecht et al.,
2007). In psychotic awake patients, dissociative thought is a
common symptom strongly associated with anxiety (Allen et al.,
1996), loosening the moorings in inner and outer reality, thus
hampering orientation in the here-and-now. In patients suffering
from posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), dissociation and
especially depersonalization is thought to protect from emotional
pain through excessive downregulation of limbic system activity
(Lanius et al., 2010) via enhanced activation in the ventral
prefrontal cortex (VPFC) (Phillips et al., 2001; Felmingham
et al., 2008) as well as altered midcingulate and insula activation
(Phillips et al., 2001; Ludaescher et al., 2010). Thus, dissociative
thought in these patients can be viewed as a self-protective
process, enabling self-conscious emotions through VPFC
activation (Damasio, 1988) and suppressing unconscious affect
arising from limbic system arousal (see Forgas, 2008).
Electrophysiologically, dissociative thought has been shown
to be associated with a suppression in the α band and raised
levels of θ activity (Giesbrecht and Merckelbach, 2006) and with a
defective communication between the frontal and temporal lobes
(Ford et al., 2005; Bob et al., 2010). Despite efforts to explain
these experiences in terms of underlying neurobiology (Frewen
and Lanius, 2006), it is still common in clinical practice to
conceptualize them in psychodynamic terms. In psychoanalytic
terminology, these would be symptoms of neurotic (Freud,
1937), borderline (Kernberg, 1967) or immature (Vaillant, 1994)
defense mechanisms that fend off undesired wishes and desires
of the Id in waking. Cognitively oriented clinical psychology
tends to interpret them as a consequence of abuse or traumatic
experiences which cause a loss of inhibitory control over affective
memories, leading to the emergence of “split” mental contents in
response to negative emotional stimuli (Yates and Nasby, 1993).
Dissociative states have often been discussed in the context
of positive symptoms in psychotic illness, which mark theses
states as undesirable. However, recent studies suggest that
dissociative thought is perhaps better understood as transient
in the early disease stages which later may – or may
not – lead to a loss of sense of self and depersonalization
(Dalle Luche, 2002). In this sense, the dissociative phenomena
observed in lucid dreaming mirror those in the early disease
stages of psychosis. Regarding normal REM-sleep dreaming
vs. lucid dreaming, the observed increase in dissociative
thought might then represent a weakening of psychosis-like
phenomena which marks dissociation in dreams as desirable.
In clinical terms, dissociative thought in lucid dreams may
serve to exit the quasi-psychotic state of dreaming, whereas
dissociative thought in patients at risk may provide the
inlet for full-blown psychosis. In both states, lucid dreaming
and psychosis, dissociative thought appears to be an interim
phenomenon which we refer to as hybrid. An interesting
question is whether lucid dreaming, and with it dissociative
thought, can be used to alleviate psychotic symptoms in wake
patients.
Regarding the function of dissociative thought, it seems to
be accompanied by a down-regulation of negative emotion
in dreaming as well as in psychiatric disorders (LaBerge
and Rheingold, 1991; Phillips et al., 2001; Voss et al., 2013;
Gackenbach and Bosveld, 2014). Several studies show lucidity
in dreams to be associated with positive rather than with
negative emotions (LaBerge and Rheingold, 1991; Voss et al.,
2013; Gackenbach and Bosveld, 2014), albeit most studies do
not differentiate between positive feelings during the dream
vs. positive feelings following awakening from a lucid dream.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 3 November 2018 | Volume 9 | Article 2164
fpsyg-09-02164 November 8, 2018 Time: 19:40 # 4
Voss et al. Insight and Dissociation
It is our observation (Voss et al., unpublished) that dreamers
often experience their lucid dreams to be emotionally neutral,
sometimes accompanied by a sense of achievement (“I did it!”
and “success!”) and euphoria after awakening, both instances
falling under the category of what Lewis (1995) refers to as
“self-conscious emotion.” Self-conscious emotions such as guilt,
shame, or empathy require the ability to reflect on the self and,
therewith, frontal lobe as well as anterior insular cortex (AIC)
activity (Gu et al., 2013).
By contrast, emotionality in normal REM sleep dreams
resembles what is known as “unconscious affect” (Oehman
and Soares, 1994; Clore and Ketelaar, 1997; Berridge, 1999;
Kihlstrom et al., 2000; Winkielman and Berridge, 2004), referring
to “valenced good/bad reactions that occur in the absence of
conscious awareness” (Winkielman and Berridge, 2004, p. 193).
Neurobiologically, unconscious affect is primarily a subcortical
process (Morris et al., 1998).
In normal REM sleep dreams, the VPFC is down-regulated,
allowing for unconscious affect to prevail (Hobson, 1992). By
contrast, lucid dreaming – through reactivation of the VPFC,
seems to increase self-conscious emotions and a down-regulation
of unconscious affect (Clore and Ketelaar, 1997), resulting in
reduced negative (and perhaps overall) emotionality compared
to normal dreams. Thus, emotional experience accompanying
dissociative thought, namely a strengthening of self-conscious
affect and a repression of unconscious emotion appear similar in
psychiatric illness and in lucid dreaming.
However, dissociation might represent a stumbling block in
the direct transference of lucid dreaming techniques on treatment
options for psychosis. In an individual treatment attempt,
Voss and Klimke (unpublished) recently tried to apply gamma
frequency band electrical stimulation of the fronto-temporal
parts of the brain in an acute psychotic patient with acoustic
hallucinations3. This method has previously been successfully
used to induce lucidity in dreams of healthy young adults
(Voss et al., 2014), resulting in enhanced ratings of insight
and dissociative thought. The respective patient reported to
normally hear a voice constantly degrading and insulting him,
also often telling him to harm himself and others by jumping
out of windows or to physically attack caretakers. He perceived
the voice as real and was not able to distance himself from
it. Following his 4th stimulation session with 40 Hz, he still
heard the voice but now he was able to “negotiate” with this
voice so as to prevent self-harm. In one instance, when his
voice told him to do a back flip from his bedside table, the
patient refused, telling his voice that this would be “not sensible.”
Instead, he jumped down from the table feet first. Following
his 5th session, however, he experienced extreme frightfulness,
asking to be restrained and to be put under surveillance. The
3The patient was extensively informed about the procedure and gave written
consent to the treatment attempt. According to guidelines pertaining to individual
treatment attempts, an ethics approval was not obtained.https://www.med.uni-
goettingen.de/de/media/V2_ethikkommitee/Informationsblatt_Individuelle_Heil
versuche.pdf. Specifically, an individual treatment attempt does not require an
ethics approval provided that the patient is informed about the procedure, gives
written consent and the procedure itself (tACS) is not completely new. All of these
recommendations were applicable in this case.
FIGURE 1 | State-dependent coherences in the 40 Hz frequency band. Short
and long range coherences obtained for waking (top), lucid dreaming (middle)
and REM sleep (bottom). Coherences are indications of interscalp networking
and synchronization. Coherences are averaged across electrode pairs in 4 s
epochs. Short-range (55 pairs) was defined as less than 10 cm and
long-range (65 pairs) as larger than 15 cm inter-electrode distance.
Coherences are lowest in REM sleep and strongly enhanced in lucid
dreaming.
treatment was immediately terminated and the patient was able
to recover.
While this particular case study must not be over-generalized,
it shows that (1) insight can indeed be triggered via mechanisms
akin to lucid dreaming and (2) that increased insight and
dissociative thought may not automatically effect positive
emotionality. Whereas in non-psychotic patients, insight and
dissociative are linked with reduced negative emotions, the
opposite may apply to psychotic patients (see also Allen et al.,
1996).
CORRELATES OF LUCID DREAMING
In our study of EEG tracings during lucid dreaming, the
most striking finding was that lucidity was accompanied by
an increased activation of the frontal lobes of the brain
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FIGURE 2 | State-dependent power in the 40 Hz frequency band. This figure shows standardized 40 Hz power (36–44 Hz) in waking (black), lucid dreaming (red)
and REM sleep (blue) in a single subject. 40 Hz band activity was chosen because effects of lucid dreaming were greatest here. Activity in the 40 Hz band has often
been linked with conscious information processing in waking. Topographic images are based on movement-free EEG episodes and are corrected for ocular artifacts.
For each state, power values are averaged across the respective episode. Depicted averages are based on episodes of equal duration. Compared to REM sleep,
lucid dreaming shows increased 40 Hz activity across the entire cortex. The increase is strongest in frontal regions (left frame) and weakest in occipital regions (right
frame).
(see Figures 1, 2). This applies both to synchronicity (Figure 1)
and to consciousness-related frequencies (40 Hz, Figure 2). In
a study on the formal features of lucid dreaming, we have
learned that the most unique characteristic of lucidity is insight
into the delusional character of the dream (Voss et al., 2013).
We take this to be a clue to a new approach to treatment,
one that reinforces frontal lobe function explicitly. We know
that the spontaneous occurrence of lucid dreaming is especially
frequent during childhood and puberty (Voss et al., 2012), a
time in which we experience the final stages of frontal lobe
myelination, and a time of synapse expansion and dendritic
growth. These neurobiological changes provide the prerequisites
for the integration of the frontal lobes into the cortico-cortical
and cortico-thalamic networks (Goldman-Rakic, 1987; Zilles
et al., 1988; Fuster, 1989). Lucid dreaming may thus occur
naturally during the final stages of frontal lobe integration, a
process similar to an update of computer hardware. It appears
that the peak in spontaneous dream lucidity in childhood and
puberty is nothing more than an accidental confounding of
conscious states during a time of high cerebral diversification.
An intriguing finding is that lucid dreaming and, through
it, dissociation, can be trained. Interestingly, dissociative
phenomena like derealization and depersonalization can also
easily be trained in the laboratory during this same period in
ontogenetic development (Leonard et al., 1999).
CLINICAL IMPLICATIONS OF LUCIDITY
As can be seen in Table 1a, lucid dreaming is physiologically
distinct from dreaming and schizophrenic psychosis in that
lucidity is accompanied by frontal lobe activation and increased
synchronicity between the frontal and occipito-parietal parts of
the brain. As to neurobiology, at present, we can only speculate
that it may be less cholinergically and more aminergically
modulated than non-lucid dreaming. With regard to cognitive
functions, imagery in lucid dreaming is as bizarre as it is in
dreaming and psychosis (Table 1b).
Example 1: “I realize I am in a dream and think of things to do.
Since it is dark and cloudy in the dream, I decide to let the sun
shine. It works, but then the sun is shining and it is still raining.”
(Voss, unpublished).
Intentional properties such as directing awareness and
performing plot control are significantly enhanced in lucid
dreaming as compared to either non-lucid dreaming or psychosis
(Table 1c).
TABLE 1 | Physiology and cognitive functions in lucid dreaming, REM sleep
dreaming, and schizophrenia.
Lucid dreaming Dreaming Schizophrenia
(a) physiology
Frontal lobe activation + − −
Synchronicity + − −
Cholinergic innervation ? + +
Aminergic innervation ? − −
(b) dream-like cognitive functions
Delusion + + +
Bizarreness + + +
Awareness + + +
Amnesia + + −
Disorientation + + −
(c) wake-like cognitive functions
Awareness of awareness + − −
Planning behavior + − −
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In dreams and psychosis alike, internally generated stimuli
that rise to consciousness are interpreted as external signals
generated by the environment. Weakening of abstract thinking
and loss of metacognitive thought (i.e., reflective thinking)
appear to determine impaired reality testing in both conditions,
suggesting a crucial role for the frontal lobes. In lucidity,
reactivation of these cerebral regions during REM sleep can
explain insight into the hallucinatory nature of one’s experience.
Intriguingly, frontal lobe processing is known to play a critical
role within the complex neural circuitry underlying lack of insight
in psychotic disorders (Antonius et al., 2011). Disruption of
synaptic plasticity in the prefrontal cortex has been confirmed
in rodent models of schizophrenia, and available antipsychotic
medications are known to modulate LTP in this area (Goto
et al., 2010). Cognitive Remediation Therapy, which contributes
to the reduction of psychotic symptoms, has also been shown to
enhance activity in the prefrontal cortex of schizophrenic patients
(Wexler and Bell, 2005).
Regarding maturational influences, clinically relevant
symptoms of the so-called major psychoses are known to emerge
during adolescence or early adult life. Neurodevelopmental
hypotheses converge on abnormal pruning or apoptosis of
prefrontal synapses and fibers as a possible pathogenetic
mechanism for the complex alterations in higher functions found
in these disorders (Bossong and Niesink, 2010).
Given this type of experimental evidence, it has been
speculated that dream lucidity might prove beneficial in fostering
insight in psychotic patients (see Dresler et al., 2015). Indeed,
one’s awareness of the internally generated hallucinatory and
often bizarre nature of the dream could be considered the
physiological equivalent of a psychotic patient’s increase in
insight. Already, dream lucidity has been proposed by some
authors as a possible therapeutic intervention in patients affected
by nightmare-related disorders such as PTSD (Brylowski, 1990;
Zadra and Pihl, 1997; Spoormaker and van den Bout, 2006; Been
and Garg, 2010). However, a recent study by Mota et al. (2016)
did not confirm the hypothesis that lucid dreams and psychotic
episodes are mirror images of each other. Psychotic patients
reported lucid dreaming episodes as often as non-psychotic
controls, and psychotic lucid dreamers had as severe psychiatric
symptoms as non-lucid psychotic dreamers. Regarding control,
lucid dreamers claimed to have even more control over the
dream plot than non-psychotic controls. Although the authors
did not explicitly assess dissociative elements in dreams and
waking in psychotic patients, our own clinical observation (Voss
and Klimke, unpublished) suggests that it is the dissociative
thought and not insight in dreams which these patients
experience as unsettling. It reminds them of their deficits in
waking thought so that they associate rather negative affect
to lucid dreams. So far, experimental evidence in favor or
against this assumption does not exist. We look forward to
future studies investigating the different aspects of lucidity in
dreams and their neurophysiologic correlates in patients with
psychotic disorders. Electrophysiologically, Voss et al. (2014)
have identified low gamma activity around 25 Hz to promote
control in dreams and activity around 40 Hz to induce insight.
As to dissociation in dreams, such information is currently not
available.
In conclusion, it appears that while lucid dreaming bears high
similarity to insightful psychosis, lucid dreaming per se seems to
be more complex. Our experimental data indicate that frontal
lobe activation in consciousness-relevant fast frequencies may
be responsible for the perceived changes in dream perception,
such as awareness of awareness and dream plot control.
Regarding dissociation, we look forward to future research on
its physiological correlates and its modulating function in lucid
dreams as well as in psychosis.
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